November 27, 1941, Ambassadors Nomura and special envoy Kurusu meet with US Secretary of State Cordell Hull, and Hull rejects Draft B, then presents the “Hull Note.” “Hull Note” (1 page) (Offered by the Diplomatic Museum at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) From 6:45 to 8:45 on Thursday November 27, 1941, Ambassador to the United States Kichisaburo Nomura and Extraordinary Ambassador Saburo Kurusu meet with US Secretary of State Hull. During the meeting, Hull presents the “Hull Note,” which demonstrated rejection Draft B. This meant that Draft B, the final strategy for Japanese negotiations as decided at the 7th Imperial Conference had failed. Document 1: B02030723300 1. From November 26, 1941 to November 27, 1941 (Image 6 to image 9 on the right) “November 26, 1941 official telegram No. 1189, from Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo (Top Secret, Chief Officer’s Code)” Document 2: B02030739100 13. Diplomatic Material Commentary on U.S.–Japan War Talks, Material on U.S.–Japan War Talks (5) Tojo Cabinet period Vol. 2. (Image 15) “68, November 27, 1941, official telegram No. 1190, from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Togo (regarding the discontinuation of talks) (Because the original of this official telegram doesn’t exist, a color photograph is unavailable.) B02030747200 Diplomatic Material Commentary on U.S.–Japan War Talks 5, Tojo cabinet period Vol. 2. 2 (Images 28 to 30) “November 27, 1941, official telegram No. 1190, from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Togo (This material is considered the manuscript copy used when document 1 was made.) Document 3: B02030723300 1. From November 26, 1941 to November 27, 1941 (Images 20 to 25) “November 26, 1941 official telegram No. 1191, from Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo (Top Secret, Chief Officer’s Code)” Document 4: B02030723400 2. From November 27, 1941 to November 28, 1941 (Images 1 to 3) “November 27, 1941 official telegram No. 1192, from Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo (Top Secret, Chief Officer’s Code)” Document 5: B02030723400 2. From November 27, 1941 to November 28, 1941 (Images 4 to 8) “November 27, 1941 official telegram No. 1193, from Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo (Top Secret, Chief Officer’s Code)” “November 27, 1941 official telegram No. 1194, from Ambassador Nomura to Foreign Minister Togo (Top Secret, Chief Officer’s Code)” On November 27th, 1941, Secretary of State Hull, in a conference with Ambassador Nomura and Special Ambassador Kurusu, rejected the final Japanese proposal offered to him on November 20th (Draft B) in a message known as the “Hull Note”, delivered to Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu. Document 1 (No. 1189) is a telegram sent on November 26th (US time) by Ambassador Nomura to the Foreign Minister Togo, reporting the summary of this conference. Document 2 (No. 1190) is a telegram from Ambassador Nomura regarding the discontinuation of talks, offering his opinion in a full report. In this document, the volume holding the originally composed telegram no longer exists and it was later (at the end of February 1946) compiled as part of the “Japan-United States negotiations materials” collection. Document 3 (No. 1191) is a telegram conveying the details of the talks, where the dialogue between Secretary of State Hull and Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Kurusu concerning each item of the “Hull Note” is reported. Document 4 (No. 1192) is a separate telegram of the materials of Document 3 sent on the 27th (US time), containing the “oral statement” (English text) from November 26th (US time) delivered at the same time as the “Hull Note”. Document 5 (Nos. 1193 & 1194) consists of telegrams sent by Ambassador Nomura addressed to Foreign Minister Togo containing the “Hull Note” (English text, 2nd image and below). The paragraph proceeding the “Hull Note” is entitled “Strictly Confidential, tentative and with commitment.” According to Document 1, the summary of the two proposals delivered by Secretary of State Hull on November 27th is as follows: Points of approval sought under the “four principles”. (1) Signing of a Japan-US – Great Britain- USSR – Dutch Indochina – Thailand non-aggression treaty. (2) A Japan-US – Great Britain- USSR – Dutch Indochina – Thailand non-aggression pact in French Indochina, and a pact for equal economic treatment and management in French Indochina. (3) The complete withdrawal of Japanese forces from China and all of French Indochina. (4) The firm promise of Japan and the United States not to support the political power of administrations other than those of Chiang Kai-Shek in China. (5) The complete concession of extraterritoriality rights in China. (6) Completion of a mutually beneficial Japan-US commerce pact as the foundation for most-favored nation status. (7) Mutual Japan-US rescinding of asset-freezing orders. (8) Stabilization of the yen-dollar exchange. The “four principles” touched upon in this proposal, also known as the “four Hull principles", are the four points below: 1. Respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations. 2. Support of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. 3. Support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity. 4. Non-disturbance of the status quo in the Pacific, however the status quo may be altered by peaceful means.